Union Carbide’s in-house investigation of the accident

Union Carbide’s in-house investigation of the accident will probably not be completed before the end of February. But an inquiry under way in India is already reaching some initial conclusions. The investigation has identified a combination of design flaws, operating errors and managerial mistakes that helped cause the accident and intensified its effects. In addition, the accident has stirred serious questions about placing modern technology in less industrialized Third World nations.

The result of seven weeks’ work by a team of Indian government officials, the report on the Bhopal accident will not be published until the opening of a judicial inquiry in India that is scheduled to begin in a month or so. But sources close to the investigation have disclosed some frightening findings. The main conclusions:

Plant safety procedures were inadequate to deal with a large-scale leak of the deadly methyl isocyanate, or MIC, despite the fact that the dangers such a leak would pose were known. Nor had any precautions been taken to protect people living near the plant site. Although a safety survey conducted by experts from Union Carbide headquarters in 1982 identified major hazards that could lead to serious incidents, no procedures were developed for alerting or evacuating the population that would be affected by an accident.

Leaky valves were a constant problem at the plant. Six serious accidents occurred at the Bhopal installation between 1978 and 1982, and three, one of which was fatal, involved gas leaks.

Some important safety systems were not working at the time of the accident. Refrigeration units designed to keep the highly reactive MIC cool so that it could not vaporize had been shut down before the accident.Other equipment, including devices designed to vent and burn off excess gases, was so inadequate, investigators hinted, that it would have been ineffective even if it had been operating at the time of the accident.

Plant workers failed to grasp the gravity of the situation as it developed, allowing the leak to go unattended for about an hour. Brief and frantic efforts to check the leak failed. As the situation deteriorated, the workers panicked and fled the plant.

Union Carbide, which disclosed late last month that leaks at its Institute, W. Va., plant had resulted in a revision of procedures there, has conceded that some of the information coming out of India is correct. The company has acknowledged that a backup storage tank that was supposed to be empty at the time of the accident had in fact been partly filled. But company officials declined to comment in detail on other findings until they could study the results of the investigation.

1. It can be inferred that the style of the passage is

  1. Critical
  2. Incriminatory
  3. Investigative
  4. Factual

2. Which of these has not been featured in the conclusions of the investigation by the Indian government officials?

  1. Failure of the plant workers to check the leak as it developed.
  2. Plant safety procedures were inadequate to deal with a large-scale leak of MIC.
  3. Union Carbide never fully advised the national government of the dangers involved in producing and storing MIC.
  4. Some important safety systems were not working at the time of the accident.

3. Which of the following can be inferred from the main conclusions of the investigation?

  1. The accident mentioned in the passage was a result of various factors that can be attributed to any plant functioning in the third world nations and not to Union Carbide’s neglect.
  2. Companies take fewer precautions at their plants in the developing countries in comparison to what they take in developed countries.
  3. Union Carbide knowingly took no steps to avoid a major accident.
  4. Union Carbide was aware of the steps it should take to avoid a major accident but shrewdly did not do so.

Answers

  1. D
  2. C
  3. C